For these and other reasons, it is necessary to include a question on ethnic belonging (“nationality”) in the 2002 Russian census, and to conduct a statistical analysis of the census materials/results on the ethnic composition of the population. This would be difficult to do without a “preliminary list.” This approach is also employed in other countries, often in a stricter manner. For example, in the United States, the census questionnaire lists ethno/racial categories from which the respondent must choose. In Russia, after several debates, it was decided that Question 7 would be formulated as follows: “To which nationality or ethnic group do you belong? (based on the respondent’s own identification).” My last recommendation to change the formulation to “Your national (ethnic) affiliation” was not accepted. However, account was taken of the criticism of the old formulation, and the word “people” (narod), followed by “nationality” (natsional'nost') in parentheses, was removed. Unfortunately, the position of the State Statistical Committee of Russia (Goskomstat) recalls the earlier recommendation of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, which was formulated under the influence of old methodological approaches (P. I. Puchkov, Z. P. Sokolova, and others).

A list of nationalities was always used in Soviet censuses, and the Institute of Ethnography has been directly involved into this procedure since census 1959. The list of nationalities and languages for the 2002 census has been prepared not for registering a variety and number of ethnic groups during the census-taking but primarily for better processing of received data based on strictly personal attribution. The main purpose of the list is to avoid some disparities in reading linguistic and local/clan/religious identity variations in received census materials and to allow computer counting of major ethnic groups through granting each group a specific code number. There are certain elements of prescription and limitation in this procedure but this “outside interference” in Russia’s census is much less than it is in many other census practices and it is not motivated by ideological/political considerations as it used to be in the past Soviet censuses.

In our view, this list does not require any official approval since it is trying to reflect a changing nature of ethnic identities and of mobilized ethnicities. Every census has always provided its own distinctive list. This is especially the case with the 2002 census in the Russian Federation, where serious changes in the ethnic composition of the population took place after 1989 as a result of a change in identification and migratory processes.

It has also been proposed that Goskomstat and the Institute of Ethnology resolve issues connected to compiling the main list together. One of these issues has to do with transferring to the category of “other nationalities” members of those nationalities whose number, based on surveys and ethnographic research, is very small in comparison with the main masses living in other countries (for example, Hungarians, Dungans, Romanians, Rusyns, Shugnantsy, and others). The list could also be shortened after the census by removing several autochthonous groups and sub-groups, whose number is also very small. For example, the Aliutortsy, who were included in the list of small indigenous peoples because of the lobbying efforts of one deputy of the State Duma, can be counted among the Koriaks, as was done in previous censuses. If only several dozens in Russia call themselves Setu, it makes no sense to count them apart from the Estonians. By my own opinion, the same applies to the Cherkeso-gai (a group among the Armenians), the Yugs (a group among the Kets), and several other categories included for the first time into 2002 census list. Some cuts have already been done while the IEA’s council considered the preliminary list of the working group.

Some groups are currently on the list because it is unclear how many migrants working in Russia—from Ukraine (specifically from the western oblasts), Moldova, and countries of Central Asia—might claim to belong to these groups. If there are several thousand, it would be unfair to exclude them from the list. However, if there are only several hundred, these results could be transferred to the category “other nationalities.” In the later case, the main results of the census would still be known, but it would not be necessary to construct expensive separate tables for each group and for each constituent unit of the federation as is done for the main list. Unfortunately, computer processing of results does not allow for the reverse operation, i.e. the transfer of a member of this or that nationality from the category “others” to the main list. However, the list is quite complete, thus it is extremely doubtful that unrecognized groups will appear that will have to be processed manually. My personal preference would be to have the main list shorter than it is now and to do more manual work with data on “other nationalities.” For example, the data on 52 ethnic categories from the 1989 census was officially published in 1992 (Chislennost’ naseleniia otdel’nykh etnicheskikh grup. Po dannym perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda. Moscow: Goskomstat, 1992), but in practice these figures were counted together with their “main nationality” (e.g., figures for the Astrakhan, Siberian, Kazan, and Litovian Tatars were aggregated with the data on Tatars published earlier in Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991).

The 2002 census list of nationalities is based on updated methodological principles that take into account contemporary ethnic dispositions, the new demands of government in the sphere of ethno-cultural policy and education, the democratization of social and political life, and the need to eliminate the defects of previous population censuses and the outdated approaches on which they were based. The main goal of the changes introduced was to safeguard the right of the citizens to declare their ethnic and language identity, and to minimize the ideological, political, and bureaucratic obstacles to the fulfillment of this right. A significant difference between the lists of nationalities in the 1989 and 2002 censuses is the number of ethnic categories. The 1989 census included 128 nationalities, while it is now proposed to increase the number to about 150 (in fact, adding 50 nationalities, while removing approximately 30).

How do we explain this proposed increase? It is attributable, first and foremost, to the fact that, beginning in 1937, the number of officially recognized peoples was lowered by order of the state, as part of its propaganda efforts aimed at highlighting the processes of consolidation in the USSR (such tendencies were characteristic of other states that were closely linked to the USSR ideologically, especially for multi-ethnic China and Vietnam, where the number of “official” nationalities was far below that of existing ethnic communities). This practice was readily pursued by the Party and intellectual elites of certain republics, which boosted the numerical strength of the dominant nationality of their republics at the expense of small ethnic communities that had supposedly merged with the dominant group. Naturally, this joining of many small peoples to the larger nationalities had an effect on the actual state of affairs in connection with “ethnic consolidation.” “Avarization,” “Darginization,” “Russification,” “Tatarization,” “Yakutization” took place at the expense of small groups, or, more precisely, at the expense of identity at a lower (local) level. The greatest advance, of course, was made by Russification, i.e. an identity shift towards the dominant culture and language. However, small ethnic communities, or smaller ethnic identities continued to exist, albeit in mixed (plural) form, their actualization dependent on the social and political context. Although academic science (ethnography and linguistics in particular) recognized and studied small cultural groups, politics and the state tried not to notice them.

The course of enlargement or consolidation joined the following peoples to larger ethnic groups: the Andiitsy, Botlikhtsy, Godoberintsy, Karatintsy, Akhvakhtsy, Bagulaly, Chamalaly, Tindaly, Tsezy, Ginukhtsy, Khvarshiny, Bezhtintsy, Gunzibtsy (usually called Ando-Tsezskie peoples), as well as the Archintsy were joined to the Avars; the Kaitagtsy and Kubachintsy to the Darginians; the Shapsugi to the Adygei; the Budugtsy, Kryzy, and Khinalugtsy to the Azerbaijanis; the Mingrelians, Laz, Svan, and Batsbiitsy to the Georgians; the Khemshily to the Armenians; the Yezidy to the Kurds; the Vod' and Kamchadaly to the Russians; the Kriashen, Siberian Tatars, and Nagaibaki to the Tatars; the Besermiane to the Udmurts; the Telengity, Teleuty, Tubalary, Kumandintsy and Chelkantsy to the Altai; the Soioty to the Buriats; the Tazy to the Udegei; the Aleuts and Kereki to the Koriaks; the Shugnantsy, Rushantsy, Bartangtsy, Ishkashimtsy, Vakhantsy, Yazgulemtsy, and Yagnobtsy to the Tajiks. A group calling itself Chulymtsys was partially included among the Tatars in the Soviet censuses, and partially among the Khakasy.

Almost all of these groups were included in the 1926 census as ethnic categories, and it was only outside arbitrary decisions that ended their formal existence. Despite the pressure exerted by officials on these groups, which consisted, in part, in prohibiting the issue of passports bearing their true nationality, some of the members of these peoples consider themselves independent to this day. In recent years, they have approached the state, as well as the academic community, with the request that their separate ethnic status be recognized. They have also formed their own national-cultural associations to preserve their cultural traditions. For example, the Union of Kriashen Autonomies (combining associations in five federal units) is quite active and has support among the Kriashen.

It would be wrong to now base ourselves on the 1926 census as the “most scientific” in order to restore some “real number of ethnic groups” in Russia. There are two problems. First, the vulnerability of the very aim of the 1926 census to divide the population into clear-cut groups called “nationalities,” which was a fundamental ethnographic and political error; and second, the significant change that has taken place in the past few decades in the nomenclature of identities, which provide the basis for constructing a picture or list called “The Peoples of Russia” (Narody Rossii) or the “Principal Nationalities of the Russian Federation.” Thus, the majority of the small peoples of contemporary western Dagestan have experienced partial cultural-linguistic Avarization and Russification. What would be most adequate for these people is a dual identity, i.e. “Andiets-Avar,” or “Kubachinets-Darginian.” However, science, statistics, and the Russian public have not yet recognized this variant of “hyphenated Rossians.” (“Rossiian” as in rossiiskii, i.e. referring to a civic identity, as opposed to the ethnic connotation of russkii/Russian).

Following my recommendation, certain categories that were included in the 1989 census have been removed from the 2002 census list, such as, Americans, Arabs, Indians, Italians, Spaniards, Cubans, and French. Each of these categories refers to the name of a citizen of a corresponding country, each of which itself characterized by a complex ethnic composition. For example, the 2000 US census included about 120 groups of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. In Spain, as we know, there are Galicians, Catalans, Basques, Gypsies, and others; in Italy, Sardinians, Friuli, Ladians, Germans, Slovenes, and others; and in France, Corsicans, Bretons, Walloons, Alsatians, a significant number of Moroccans and Algerians. As for the previously used category of Afghans, which also refers to citizenship and not ethnic affiliation, it too was excluded from the list. However, because of the large number of migrants from this country in Russia, the list of nationalities includes its main ethnic groups—Pushtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. But, things are not so simple and there is a problem here too. Ethnic identification is influenced by where a person is. An inhabitant of Afghanistan, as a rule, identifies with a particular ethnic community. Transferred to Central Asia, he might retain this identification, but, in Moscow, he identifies with and presents himself as an “Afghan,” a collective cultural-political type. In the same way, when in Moscow, the Svan, Mingrelians, Batsbii, and Ajarians identify as Georgians, and this is precisely how they should register in the Russian census. In the Georgian census, the approach should be different.

The Arabs have been excluded from the 2002 list because the category includes numerous peoples, living principally in Arab countries (Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and so forth). In addition, the list also excludes several categories pertaining mostly to foreign citizens, since, during the period between the two censuses (1989-2002), their number in Russia has dropped significantly. Among these groups are the Austrians, Albanians, Amhar, English, Beludzh, Bengalis, Dutch, Serb, Punjabis, Portuguese, Slovaks, Somalis, Croats, Montenegrins, Czechs, Swedes, and Japanese. It was more expedient to shift these small groups to the category “Other Nationalities,” than to include them among the “Principal Nationalities of Russia.” As we know, this is precisely how the results of the census are handled or interpreted, and those 128 peoples of Russia according to the 1989 census, or the 176 peoples according to the mid-decennial 1994 census, included over thirty categories of the aforementioned small “foreign groups.”

The introduction of complex categories reflects more accurately Russia’s ethnic mosaic. I am certain that, in the near fuure, we will recognize the principle of ‘horizontal’ multiple ethnic affiliation in such common cases as Russian-Armenian, Russian-Jewish, Evenk-Yakut, and many other combinations, when an individual (particularly from an ethnically-mixed family) commands the language and identifies with the culture of both his mother and father to an equal degree, and has a complex sense of ethnic belonging. But difficulties confront us in the preparation and carrying out of the 2002 census in securing approval for such an approach, which is, in fact, not perfect and reflects the old methodology to a certain degree (ethnos/sub-ethnos taxonomy). In my opinion, dual identification based on a system of “sub-categories” is valid and would partly resolve the problem. For example, it would include the Erzia and Moksha, but, at the same time, preserve the Mordva.

The question remains, though, which groups should be shifted to a category or sub-category? Which group can be divided, and which can not? Georgians in Georgia, yes, but probably not Georgians in Russia. The Siberian Tatars, among whom there are both Volga Tatars and Siberian Tatars proper, can be counted both as a separate group (as recommended by the IEA’s working group and the Council) and as a sub-group of the Tatars (my own personal opinion, following consultation with professor N. A. Tomilov). A similar determination is required for the Kriashen: one segment, particularly that inhabiting Tatarstan, did not want to definitively break with the Tatars, and another part sees itself in opposition to the Tatars (“We are not Tatars,we are Kriashen”).

It is not totally clear to me that the list should include a whole series of groups that are the products of elite manipulations of the past few years and a demonstration of ethnographic knowledge (for example, the Nagaibak, Soiot as separate groups, or the Mennonites, Greek-Urum, Cherkeso-gai, Mishar, and Astrakhan Tatars as sub-groups). It is my view that the first version of the list of nationalities prepared by the working group of the Institute of Ethnology (191 groups and 28 sub-groups, for a total of 219 names) was based on a vision of the country with its former borders and the romantic desire to reflect the “true picture of ethnoses.” This would not only demonstrate a “democratic” impulse and ethnographic knowledge, but also gratify the “international community,” which continues to believe that, to this day, dozens of unacknowledged minorities are hidden in the “multi-national mini-empire.”

How to proceed? In the current situation, where the theory of ethnos hold complete sway over science and politics, there is no ideal solution to the problem of the 2002 census concerning nationalities and languages (the language issue is best discussed separately). What is important is the very process of discussion and analysis, as well as collaboration among scholars, statisticians, and social and political actors, i.e. in its own way, the census is a process of negotiation about how to categorize the citizens of a given country.

The views of foreign specialists on this subject are interesting and important. Up until recently, under the influence of the cold war mentality and ill-qualified Russian expertise, these views were characterized by inconsistency, and could be summed up in the simple phrase, “What the Russians consider bad, the Americans think good.” We see this, at least, in complimentary or uncritical Western assessments of the positions of Tatar nationalism on the issues of passport nationality, Tatarstan citizenship (ten-year permanent settlement requirement), and the refusal to count the Kriashen separately from the Tatars. Joint discussion of the issues outlined here in the context of a new project will help elevate the level of academic analysis, and contribute to the socio-cultural development of the people of Russia and more effective government in the Russian Federation. International academic expertise may assist to counteract manipulations and restrictions, inflamed nationalistic rhetoric and political pressure already there in Russia.